

**ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
TRAFFIC CONTROL BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION, OQMG**

1941 - 1942

Monograph prepared by
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December 1943

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WAR DEPARTMENT

War Department Special Staff

Historical Division

Review Section

20 March 1946

- TITLE: 1. The Transportation Advisory Group in the Office of Quartermaster General, 1941 – 1942. Monograph No. 1 (1 Vol. 20 pp.)
2. Organization and Activities of the Traffic Control Branch, Office of the Quartermaster General, 1941 – 1942. Monograph No. 2 (1 Vol. 16 pp. Text, 6 Appendices.)

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CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

ACTION REQUESTED: Approval

ACTION RECOMMENDED: Approval for file

REVIEW:

1. Contents. The first of these studies, "The Transportation Advisory Group" deals with the limited activities of a group of ten men, representing the Army, the Government, and the transportation systems of the United States, established by the Quartermaster General in January 1941 to assist him in setting up proper controls over transportation and to utilize civilian transportation facilities in the most efficient manner. He hoped in this way to avoid, in the event of an emergency, the transportation debacle of the first year of the last war. All but one member of the Group were civilians, with no official status except as consultants. The chairman (who, incidentally, is the author of both studies under review) was a civilian on the staff of the Quartermaster General. The Transportation Group met rarely. Its members were utilized in their individual capacity as expert consultants. Most of the work of the group was performed by the chairman who corresponded with the individual members on matters related to their special fields and called them into consultation when necessary. Generally the members showed interest in their own special field and attempted more than once to secure advantages for their own interests. During the two years of its existence - it was discontinued in January 1943 - the Group never acted officially and the advice of its members was sought only from time to time. After the reorganization of the Army in March 1942, there was little need for the advice of the Group. Its chairman continued to serve in an official capacity until the Group was dissolved.

Monograph No. 2, "Organization and Activities of the Traffic Control Branch ..." is related to the first by subject matter and personnel. In order to avoid the experiences of World War I in transportation, the Traffic Control Branch was organized in April 1941 "to aid in the movement

of such War Department traffic as fell within the province of the Transportation Division of the OQMG. The growth of overseas shipments in 1940 and early 1941 indicated that strict control of portbound traffic was necessary. The Transportation Advisory Group was a section of the Traffic Control Branch, and its chairman, the author of this study, was made chief of the Branch in July 1941. The Traffic Control Branch established procedures in an attempt to provide a smooth flow of freight to the ports. These procedures involved mainly providing the Transportation Division with information on important traffic movements, the adequacy of facilities to handle such movements, and the utilization of traffic control measures. When the War Department was reorganized in March 1942, a Transportation Service was established and the Control Branch ceased to function.

2. Evaluation. Although these studies are called monographs, they are actually too limited in scope and too brief to merit this description. If two or more of these studies were brought together in a single volume, the result would undoubtedly prove to be an interesting monograph on transportation activities in the Army prior to the establishment of the Transportation Service.

The author knows his subject and has presented the material clearly. The volumes carry a tone of authenticity which derives from the author's participation in the activities of the organization described.

LOUIS MORTON

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
TRAFFIC CONTROL BRANCH
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION, OQMG

1941 - 1942

The Traffic Control Branch of the Quartermaster General's Transportation Division was organized in April 1941. Transportation Division Office Memorandum No. 22, April 28, 1941

(Appendix I), stated that the new branch had been set up “to aid in the movement of such War Department traffic as comes within the province of this division”. Colonel Douglas C. Cordiner was appointed its first Chief, and selected its personnel and organized its activities. Although not expressly limited to overseas traffic, the Branch confined itself to that field and did not deal with purely domestic traffic.

The inauguration of the Traffic Control Branch was the result of discussions extending over several months. During the first year of our participation in World War I, lack of control over traffic moving to the ports had resulted in serious congestion at ship and rail terminals along the North Atlantic seaboard, wasteful detention of railway equipment under load at ports and on sidings many miles back of the ports, delays in the loading of transports, and failure in many instances to place aboard the transports the supplies which the American Expeditionary Forces most urgently needed. The growth of the War Department’s ocean traffic in 1940 and early 1941, resulting from the establishment of new overseas bases and the enlargement of existing installations, together with the anticipated heavy increase in overseas shipment due to the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, indicated that strict control of port-bound traffic would become necessary sooner or later, if the experiences of the last war were to be avoided.

In connection with the discussion of the control of traffic, the question arose whether this control should be exercised by the Transportation Division in Washington, or by the respective ports of embarkation. The chief argument for decentralization to the ports was their possession of more complete and up-to-the-minute knowledge of local traffic conditions than headquarters in Washington possibly could achieve. On the other hand, many circumstances favored centralized control, especially the closer contact of the Transportation Division with other elements of the War Department and other federal agencies concerned with transportation, as well as the Association of American Railroads and other private transportation groups represented in Washington by central offices.¹

Control of all War Department traffic was contemplated by The Quartermaster General in Office Order No. 25-D, February 24, 1941, which authorized, as part of the Transportation Division, a "Troop Movement Control Branch" and a "Freight and Cargo Control Branch". When the Traffic Control Branch was established in the following April, however, it was organized primarily to deal with freight movements. There did not then appear to be any imminent need for control of troop movements beyond that which existing agencies were in a position to exercise.

The primary duties of the Traffic Control Branch, as expressed and implied in Transportation Division Office Memorandum No. 22, were to provide the Division with full information, as far in advance as possible regarding important traffic movements and the adequacy of facilities to handle such movements; to see that the means of controlling traffic already available to the Water Transport Branch and Commercial Traffic Branch were coordinated and effectively utilized; to recommend additional control measures if and when the necessity should become apparent. These duties were purely administrative and supervisory. The memorandum implied that additional duties embracing the actual exercise of control might be added, but this did not transpire.

The means available for use in connection with the control of War Department traffic were numerous, but their effectiveness was limited. Under Army regulations ², prior to shipping freight within the United States on government bill of lading, the shipper was required to obtain a routing order from the Quartermaster General, if the shipment consisted of two carloads or more. The routing orders were issued by the Commercial Traffic Branch of the Transportation Division in response to shippers' requests, and copies were sent to the respective ports of embarkation and the Water Transport Branch for their information when the shipments involved were moving to overseas destinations. The Water Transport branch received daily teletype summaries from the ports of embarkation indicating the total tonnage of cargo on hand and enroute. Weekly mail reports, classifying the cargo on hand according to destination, were forwarded to the Water Transport Branch from the New York and San Francisco ports of embarkation. From such information the Transportation Division was in a position to determine when a port was threatened with congestion, to insert requests in new routing orders that shipments be held until specified dates, and to request the shipping services to delay the actual forwarding of goods already routed. However, the Transportation Division had no authority to insist that shipments be held at the source, and the supply services, which in many instances had not yet been able to bring production into line with requirements and were under constant pressure to speed up deliveries to the bases overseas, were most anxious to have their supplies moved to the ports as soon as they became available. Consequently the requests of the Transportation Division in respect to dates of shipment were of uncertain effect, to say the least. The railroads could embargo shipments in order to prevent the congestion of their facilities at the ports, but they were reluctant to do so except in cases of extreme emergency.

During the early months of 1941, other directives were issued with a view to promoting the smooth flow of War Department traffic. To aid the Transportation Division in scheduling the transports, and the ports of embarkation in planning the use of their piers and warehouses, the chiefs of supply arms and services were directed to furnish the Quartermaster General, on the first of each month, with a forecast of the tonnage expected to be shipped from New York, New Orleans, San Francisco and Seattle respectively, during the ensuing two months.³ War Department officers making shipments of one carload or more consigned to any unit or officer of the War Department were required send the consignees advance notice thereof by telegraph or teletype, and to arrange that War Department contractors making shipments to ports of embarkation should do likewise.⁴ Neither of these arrangements worked out satisfactorily; the former because the forecasts provided by the services often proved very unreliable, and the latter because shippers so frequently overlooked sending the required notice.

As a means of maintaining a better flow of information from the supply arms and services to the Transportation Division, and more effective coordination in relation to specific movements, the Quartermaster General Recommended, and instructions were issued accordingly by the Adjutant General, that each supply arm and service appoint a liaison officer with the Transportation Division, this officer to be kept thoroughly familiar at all times with present and probable future traffic requirements, the availability of supplies for shipment and the status of priority schedules.

⁵ Such liaison officers were given desk space in the Traffic Control Branch.

Although it had been functioning prior thereto, the organization of the Traffic Control Branch was not formally announced until June 13, 1941. ⁶ The announcement established four sections, namely, Administrative, Traffic Facilities, Traffic Control, and Liaison. The main lines of activity in the latter three sections are given below as they were carried out in practice.

The Traffic Facilities Section, the title of which soon was changed to Ports and Terminals Section, studied railway, highway, dock and storage facilities with a view to determining the capacities of the respective ports and making recommendations regarding improvements which might seem desirable in view of anticipated traffic movements. In addition to correspondence with local authorities, representatives of the Section visited the principal ports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts in May and June 1941, in order to make a first-hand survey of conditions and establish direct liaison with Army officers and representatives of the municipalities, civic organizations and transportation companies. The objectives of the Traffic Control Branch were explained, and its readiness to assist the local authorities with their traffic problems was emphasized. As a result of the survey, the conclusion was reached that the existing facilities of Atlantic and Gulf ports, if properly utilized, would prove adequate to meet the requirements of war.

The Liaison Section held daily meetings with the liaison officers of the supply arms and services, in order to receive reports regarding prospective traffic to facilitate arrangements with the Commercial Traffic Branch and the Water Transport Branch for the expeditious handling of such traffic, and to receive and process any specific instructions or complaints which the supply arms and services might file regarding the handling of shipments already moving or about to move.

The Traffic Control Section utilized all sources of information in order to build up a picture of current and prospective traffic and transportation requirements, and developed the details of a system for the control of individual port-bound shipments, to be put into effect if and when the necessity therefore should be recognized. The nucleus of an organization to administer such control was assembled. The system was never put into operation, however, as will be explained hereafter.

Under the personal direction of the Chief of the Branch, studies were made of the proposal to move all traffic to Panama and the Caribbean bases via New Orleans, the possibility was explored of utilizing barges in lieu of ships for certain overseas freight movements from New Orleans, and inquiry was initiated regarding the causes and possible remedies for the congestion of the steamship terminals at the Panama Canal.

Effective July 1, 1941, Colonel Cordiner was appointed Chief of the Marine Design, Construction and Procurement Branch of the Transportation Division, and the Traffic Control Branch was placed in charge of Mr. C. C. Wardlow, who as Chairman of the Quartermaster General's Transportation Advisory Group had been associated with the work of the Branch from its inception. ⁷ Just prior to this change the personnel of the Branch included three officers and eighteen civilians.

Because of the large amount of construction materials being sent to the bases at Panama, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Bermuda, the port facilities at these bases frequently were overtaxed and in some instances acute congestion developed. In order to be fully informed regarding such developments, and be in a position to propose remedial measures, arrangements were made in July 1941 for the Traffic Control Branch to receive a radiogram from each of these bases each Monday, stating whether traffic conditions at the ports were satisfactory or unsatisfactory, and a detailed report each week by air mail. On the basis of these reports and other information, steps were taken to bring about an improvement of conditions at Panama and Trinidad.

Although, as indicated above, the port facilities on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts seemed adequate to meet requirements, even if we should become actively engaged in the war, there already was reason to fear lest full and effective utilization should be prejudiced by lack of advance planning. There were many claimants for these facilities – Navy, Quartermaster General, Air Corps and Corps of Engineers, in addition to the commercial operators. There was evidence that good deep-water ports were being leased for use primarily as storage facilities and ship repair shops, and that others were being allowed to lapse into disrepair because of lack of immediate employment. There was no one agency with clear authority to effect the coordination which seemed necessary. The subject had been discussed among the interested federal agencies, but no definite action had been taken. In August 1941 the Traffic Control Branch recommended that the War Department take the lead in bringing about such coordination.⁸ The acquisition of facilities at the ports eventually was placed under control by an agreement to clear all proposed lease or purchase contracts through the Army and Navy Munitions Board.⁹ As regards coordination in other matters of port operations, this was left to the voluntary action of the federal and local agencies concerned.

During the spring and summer of 1941 the Army began to experience difficulty in providing sufficient refrigerated space on transports serving the West Indies and Pacific bases. Purveyors who were under contract to deliver frozen or chilled subsistence to the bases also complained of lack of suitable space on the commercial lines. The volume of such traffic was increasing rapidly not only because of the growth of the garrisons overseas, but also the large number of contractors' civilian employees engaged in construction work at the bases, for whose subsistence requirements the Army assumed a measure of responsibility. The Traffic Control Branch was directed to study and find a solution for this problem, in conjunction with the Water Transport Branch. A measure of relief was obtained through the increased use of refrigerator boxes of about 400 cubic feet capacity, which were carried on deck or in the ship's hold, and could be transferred intact to shore installations if necessary. Further relief came from increased refrigerated capacity on commercial vessels serving the bases, as well as on the growing fleet of Army transports. An arrangement worked out between Army and Navy officials at San Francisco for the joint use of refrigerated space on transports of the respective services proved helpful. The Quartermaster General's Subsistence Branch agreed to the principle that insofar as practicable the quartermasters at the bases should contract locally for perishable supplies.

In view of the fact that additional machinery for the control of shipments to the ports had not become necessary, the Traffic Control Branch was reorganized in early August 1941 and the

personnel was reduced. The Traffic Control Section was dropped. All activities relating to specific shipments were discontinued and the liaison officers of the supply arms and services were instructed to deal directly with the Commercial Traffic Branch and Water Transport Branch regarding such matters. The reorganized branch included a Traffic Section for the study of problems relating to War Department shipments, and a Research Section for the study of the general transportation situation and outlook.¹⁰

In order to give the Transportation Division and the ports of embarkation more complete information regarding port-bound shipments, the Traffic Control Branch joined with other branches in recommending that any such shipments amounting to one carload or more (instead of two carloads as provided in AR 30-905) be subject to release and routing orders issued by The Quartermaster General. The resultant directive also stipulated that any instructions transmitted by The Quartermaster General in connection with the release and routing orders would be followed by the shippers.¹¹ The new arrangement which was applicable to Army contractors as well as the shipping officers at Army installation, placed the Transportation Division in a better position to regulate traffic to the Army ports of embarkation, but it still lacked the authority necessary to exercise complete control.

During the summer of 1941, the Traffic Control Branch developed, with the cooperation of the supply arms and services, a forecast of freight shipments from the United States to the several overseas bases for the fiscal year 1942, including shipments by contractors. This estimate, issued under date of September 30, 1941, was the first comprehensive and coordinated statement of the kind which the Transportation Division had been able to obtain for its guidance in procuring and scheduling transports. It forecast the movement of approximately 8,670,000 measurement tons during the year, of which about 6,000,000 tons would be shipped by the Army, and 2,670,000 tons by Army contractors. Army shipments during the fiscal year 1941 had amounted to only 1,200,000 measurement tons, and the forecasted increase gave an indication of the seriousness of the problem which confronted the Army in providing bottoms to meet its overseas shipping requirements.

Although War Department Circular No. 182 provided that contractors making shipments to Army ports of embarkation would obtain release and routing orders from the Quartermaster General and send telegraphic notice of actual forwarding, this was frequently overlooked, especially in the case of shipments on commercial bills of lading, which were not specifically mentioned in the circular. As a result, a number of large shipments of construction materials destined to the overseas bases arrived at the New York Port of Embarkation unannounced, causing congestion and confusion. A study of this matter by the Traffic Control Branch led to an understanding that the provisions of Circular No. 182 would apply to all shipments of one carload or more to an Army port of embarkation.¹²

In August 1941, pursuant to a meeting held in the office of the Maritime Commission, an Intercoastal Shipping Priorities Advisory Committee was formed, composed of representatives of the Maritime Commission, Office of Production Management, Office of Price Administration, Army, Navy and other federal departments. The Chief of the Traffic Control Branch represented the Quartermaster General on this Committee until after our entry into the war, when intercoastal

shipping virtually ceased. The purpose of the committee was to advise the Maritime Commission regarding commodity priorities in connection with freight movements by the Intercoastal steamship lines, whose services had been curtailed severely by the withdrawal of tonnage for employment on other routes. The principal problem related to shipments of lumber from the west coast and iron and steel products from the east coast. The Army's interest primarily was in lumber, large quantities of which were required for construction work in the eastern part of the United States and at new bases in the Atlantic. In addition to priorities, the committee concerned itself with the problem of diverting some of this traffic to the railways. This proved difficult in the case of lumber because of the inadequacy of rail facilities at many west coast mills. The westbound movement of iron and steel products on the other hand did not become critical because diversion to the rails presented no difficulties.

During the summer of 1941 the Army decided to construct two in-transit depots to back up the northern range of Atlantic ports, and sites were selected at Marietta, Pennsylvania, and Voorheesville, New York. Later in the year it was decided to build special piers for handling explosives at New York, Boston and Baltimore. In the course of the autumn, however, it was agreed that many more such installations would be needed to meet the requirements of the war. Accordingly, a program was drawn up during November, calling for the construction of a number of additional in transit depots, or holding and reconsignment points as they later were known, and additional piers for loading explosives as well as special storage facilities for explosives to back up certain Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific ports. This program was submitted to G-4 by the Chief of the Transportation Division, with concurrence of the Ordnance Department, under date of December 4, 1941. It was approved in substance before the end of that month. The Traffic Control Branch worked closely with the other elements of the Transportation Division, and with representatives of the Ordnance Department and the Corps of Engineers, in formulating this program, and served as liaison office for the Transportation Division in connection with the selection of sites for the new installations and the expedition of the construction work.

In October 1941 when the General Staff decided to increase the movement of troops and supplies to the Philippine Islands, the Traffic Control Branch was called upon to coordinate the freight movement, with the specific purpose of insuring that the supply arms and services make the required supplies available with the least possible delay, that the necessary shipping be procured to move these supplies, and that the freight arrive at the ports in such quantities and at such times as would insure balanced cargoes and avoid delays in loading.¹³ Of the 500,000 tons contemplated for this special movement, about 75,000 tons had been floated up to December 7, 1941.

During the weeks immediately following the entry of the United States into the war, the volume of Army shipments overseas greatly increased and their prompt movement became a matter of the utmost urgency. Very large quantities of lend-lease supplies also were moving. The Traffic Control Branch, in conjunction with the ports of embarkation and the Association of American Railroads, maintained a daily check on traffic conditions at the principal Atlantic and Pacific ports and recommended measures to relieve or forestall congestion. Such recommendations included the readjustment of ship schedules so as to take some of the load off the primary ports of New York and San Francisco, the removal from ground storage at the ports of certain supplies

and equipment which were not scheduled for early shipment, and the greater use of the holding and reconsignment points and other inland storage facilities for the temporary holding of supplies pending the readiness of the ships to load them.

The need for establishing positive control over specific port-bound shipments was at once apparent, but the means were not immediately available. At a meeting hold in the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture on December 11, 1941, attended by representatives of various governmental and private agencies, the primary interest of the War Department in the maintenance of fluid conditions at the ports was recognized and the other governmental agencies agreed to honor any requests which the War Department might make upon them in regard to the movement of their supplies. The Chief of the Transportation Division was designated to work out the necessary arrangements and to represent the War Department in making such arrangements effective; he in turn designated the Chief of the Traffic Control Branch to handle the details.¹⁴ The informal and tentative arrangements thus established provided a measure of control over government export freight, which was especially needed in respect to lend-lease shipments by Agriculture and Treasury, and proved helpful in forestalling disastrous congestion at certain ports until a more comprehensive and effective plan could be agreed upon.

Such congestion as developed at the seaboard was not entirely due to overseas shipments. General depots were located at certain of the ports, and the flow of supplies to those installations, for issue to the posts and camps which they served, naturally increased greatly with the coming of war. A directive issued by The Adjutant General in January 1942 made carload shipments to depots in port areas, whether intended for overseas or domestic use, subject to release and routing by the Quartermaster General.¹⁵

With the reorganization of the Army in March 1942, and the establishment of a Transportation Service in the new Services of Supply, the Traffic Control Branch ceased to exist. Its functions in connection with the regulation of traffic were taken over by a Transportation Control Committee, which was organized in the same month under a plan initially adopted by the War Department, the Office of Defense Transportation and the War Shipping Administration, and later joined by the Navy Department. As in the case of the Traffic Control Branch, the Transportation Control Committee functioned only in respect to freight. Unlike the Traffic Control Branch, the new committee possessed positive authority, by delegation from the recently established Office of Defense Transportation, to control the movement of all export freight, including commercial, up to ship side.

FOOTNOTE PAGE

¹ The reasons for retaining control of traffic in Washington were set forth fully in a letter from The Quartermaster General to the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, June 19, 1941, Appendix II.

- ² AR 30-905, par. 15, Changes 2, October 1, 1937
- ³ AG 541.2 (1-13-31) M-D, Subject: "Shipments of Cargo by the Supply Arms and Services", January 22, 1941
- ⁴ AG 523.01 (2-28-41) M-D-M, Subject: "Notice by Wire to government Consignees", March 4, 1941; OQMG Circular Letter No. 45, same subject, March 20, 1941
- ⁵ AF 210.69 (4-9-41) M-D, Subject: "Liaison with Traffic Section, Office of the Quartermaster General", April 17, 1941.
- ⁶ Traffic Control Branch Office Memorandum No. 3, Appendix III.
- ⁷ Transportation Division Office Memorandum No. 45, Subject: "Organization of Transportation Division, July 1, 1941
- ⁸ Memorandum, Chief of Traffic control Branch to Chief of Transportation Division, August 8, 1941
- ⁹ This arrangement was proposed by the Chairman of the Maritime Commission in a letter to the Under Secretary of War, dated October 6, 1941, and was approved by the Under Secretary of War and Navy shortly thereafter.
- ¹⁰ Transportation Division Office Memorandum No. 45-C, September 18, 1941
- ¹¹ War Department Circular No. 182, Sec. IV, August 28, 1941.
- ¹² Memoranda, Transportation Division to the Construction Division, OQMG, and the Chief of Engineers, October 17, 1941.
- ¹³ Memoranda outlining the procedure to be followed were sent to all supply services on October 23, 1941, similar to that attached as Appendix IV.
- ¹⁴ Subject dealt with in two memoranda by Colonel T. H. Dillon, both dated December 12, 1941. See Appendices V and VI.
- ¹⁵ AG 523.01 (1-24-42) MO-D-M, January 26, 1942, "Control of Freight Shipments."

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION) NO. 22

April 28, 1941

OFFICE MEMORANDUM)

SUBJECT: Organization of Traffic Control Branch

1. A traffic Control Branch has been set up in the Transportation Division to aid in the movement of such War Department traffic as comes within the province of this Division.
2. The first duty of the Traffic Control Branch is to keep itself and other interested Branches informed as far in advance as possible of all important prospective traffic movements, the priorities in connection therewith, the facilities available and to make recommendations for improving or increasing such facilities as may seem necessary to handle the anticipated traffic.
3. Its second duty is to plan such control measures as may be necessary to avoid undue traffic congestion or delay, to recommend when Such measures should be undertaken, and to exercise such control as may be authorized by the Chief of the Transportation Division,
4. In order to avoid duplication the Traffic Control Branch will utilize the services of the Water Transport and Commercial Traffic Branches and other established agencies whenever possible.
5. To insure proper coordination all scheduled sailings, routine or otherwise, will be routed through the Traffic Control Branch for concurrence. In case of a non-concurrence that cannot be adjusted, the matter will be referred to the Chief of Division for decision.

By direction of Colonel Dillon:

OLIVER

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Appendix II

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE QUARTERMASTER GENERAL
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1941

Brigadier General H. M., Groninger
New York Port of Embarkation,
Brooklyn, New York.

Dear General Groninger:

Replying to your personal letter to me of June 10, 1941, outlining a tentative plan for a Port Transportation Zone at New York, I believe that we should look ahead still farther and develop the most suitable traffic plan for taking care of full war-time requirements and avoiding possible congestion and other difficulties incident thereto.

Sooner or later it may become necessary to arrange some form of more complete traffic control by this office, that is, by the Transportation Division of The Quartermaster General's Office, with a release and permit system to regulate and control all cargo movements into the ports, giving full consideration to the wishes of the Port Commanders and all conditions existing at the time.

For this purpose this office would place an Assistant Traffic Manager at each of the principal ports who would act as the central traffic agent there along the lines proposed in your letter, and also as liaison officer with the Port Commander, so that the flow of traffic into and out of the port would be regulated to meet his desires.

The reasons for retaining traffic control in this office, rather than distributing this function among the various Port Commanders, are as follows:

- a. This office, being located in Washington, has direct liaison with the General Staff, the other Services, the Navy and Maritime Commission, and all transportation agencies, and has earlier information than the Port Commanders regarding plans for movement of troops and supplies, priority of movement in connection therewith, and the transportation facilities available.
- b. This office provides and controls the movement of water transport and assignment of transports and chartered ships to various ports and schedules, makes arrangements for obtaining space on commercial ships, and has earlier information regarding availability of ships for clearing congestion at ports than do the Port Commanders.
- c. This office already arranges the routines of and transportation for all important War Department traffic movements, including movements to the ports, and can easily install a release or permit system in connection therewith.
- d. This office, through its connections with all transportation systems, rail, motor, and water, is in the best position to keep advised of day by day and hour by hour locations of all shipments under way, and therefore is in the best position to clear priority traffic, to arrange for temporary or intransit storage in interior yards and warehouses, if necessary, and to divert traffic from one port to another, depending upon the loading conditions at the ports and the water transport available.
- e. This office is in a better position than Port Commanders to divert traffic, as necessary, from Atlantic and Pacific ports to the Gulf, or vice-versa, or from the jurisdiction of one Port Commander to that of another.
- f. This office is already handling satisfactorily the movement of all War Department Lease-Lend traffic, in accordance with the principles outlined above.
- g. If some sort of general traffic coordinating agency is established by the President for controlling all traffic, it will undoubtedly be centered in Washington, and The Quartermaster General's Office would presumably be represented thereon to take care of the War Department's interests.

It is for these reasons, as well as because this office has the personnel, trained through past operations along these lines, that The Quartermaster General is now controlling and should continue to control the flow of traffic for the War Department. Our aim and primary duty is to keep supplies moving and avoid delays, to regulate these movements so as to avoid congestion, and to insure that ample facilities are always available for any cargo or troop movements that may be directed.

I believe you will understand and readily agree with the reasons underlying this arrangement. I would like to talk over the matter with you more in detail, and hope to have an opportunity to do so soon.

Very truly yours,

E.B.GREGORY
Major General
The Quartermaster General

C O P Y

Appendix III

June 13, 1941

TRAFFIC CONTROL BRANCH)

OFFICE MEMORANDUM) NO 3

1. Under instructions to be issued by the Chief of Transportation Division, the following sections will comprise the Traffic Control Branch.

- a. Administrative Section – In Charge, Mr. Biehl.
- b. Traffic Facilities -----In Charge, Mr. Haley.

c. Traffic Control -----In Charge, Colonel Crede.

d. Liaison-----In Charge, Major Smith.

(1) Quartermaster Supply – Motor – Construction – Major Smith

(2) The Surgeon General ----- Lt. J. R. Rice

(3) Chief of the Air Corps -----Lt. W. A. McClintic

(4) Chief, Chemical Warfare Service -----Major A. L. Koch

(5) Chief of Coast Artillery -----Capt. Dean R. Dickey

(6) Chief of Engineers -----Lt. N. W. Coburn

(7) Chief of Ordnance ----- Capt. A. G. Stone

(8) Chief Signal Officer -----Lt. Roy T. Durst

e. Advisory Group -----In Charge, Mr. Wardlow.

2. In the absence of the undersigned, Mr. Wardlow will act as Chief of the Branch.

CORDINER

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Appendix IV

QM 541.1 T-TC

(PHILIPPINES)

October 23, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF ORDNANCE.

ATTENTION: Major Kerr.

SUBJECT: Shipments to Philippine Department.

1. With further reference to the meeting held in the office of Lieut. Colonel Ross, G-4, on Saturday, October 18th at which time it was indicated that the transportation of all supplies and equipment to be shipped to the Philippine Department would be coordinated by Mr. C. C. Wardlow of this office, the following procedure is outlined.

2. As soon as you are able to designate supplies and/or equipment for shipment to the Philippines, a memorandum should be addressed to Mr. Wardlow, in duplicate, giving the place of origin (depot or contractor), the anticipated date of availability (or schedule of delivery), the weight and measurement of each unit, and any additional information regarding priorities, special handling, etc. These memoranda should be serially numbered and marked "Confidential".

3. The above-mentioned memorandum is intended only for Mr. Wardlaw's information, to enable him to determine as far in advance as possible, whether the shipment can be moved by regular transport or whether chartered tonnage will be required. Mr. Wardlow will coordinate with our Commercial Traffic Branch and Water Transport Branch in regard to these prospective shipments.

4. As soon as you definitely know on what date a particular shipment of one carload or more, or equivalent, will be ready to move from point of origin, a request for release and routing should be filed with our Commercial Traffic Branch., in accordance with War Department, Circular No. 182, page 3., paragraph 15 ½, August 28, 1941. No port of shipment should be

inserted when this form is made up; the port will be entered by the Commercial Traffic Branch when the shipment has been booked for a specific sailing, and a copy of the completed form will then be returned to you.

5. The regulation cited in paragraph 4 applies only to shipments of one carload or more. Smaller quantities may be shipped to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation without obtaining release and routing from this office.

For The Quartermaster General:

T. H. DILLON,
Colonel, Q.M.C.
Assistant.

COPY

Appendix V

December 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

1. Recognizing that military necessity and the general need for maintaining fluid traffic conditions at the Ports require the close cooperation of all concerned, it has been mutually agreed by certain other governmental agencies that they would honor requests of the War Department in making such cooperation effective.

2. This agreement was reached at a meeting held in the office of the Secretary of Agriculture on the afternoon of December 11, 1941. The governmental agencies there represented were Agriculture, Treasury Procurement, War Department, Lend-Lease, National Advisory Commission (Transportation). Representatives of the Association of American Railroads were also present. Representatives of the Emergency Shipping Group of the Maritime Commission were later advised of the results of the meeting, and stated that their support could be relied upon. It is expected that other governmental agencies will likewise consent to this agreement as and when their cooperation seems advisable.

3. Colonel T. H. Dillon, Chief of Transportation Division, Quartermaster General's Office, was designated by the War Department as its agent through whom such requests would ordinarily be made.

(This memorandum was prepared by Colonel Dillon for the record.)

COPY

Appendix VI

December 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

1. The attached memorandum, dated December 12, 1941, sets forth the essential features of a general agreement for providing against congestion of our Ports and transportation and storage facilities adjacent thereto. Steps to be taken for implementing this agreement seem fairly simple.

2. Each governmental shipping agency has its own traffic group. As a first precaution, it is highly desirable not to ship to the ports unless arrangements have been made insuring that shipments will be promptly unloaded and disposed of at the receiving end. Secondly, each governmental shipping agency should have up-to-date and accurate information regarding what is being shipped and what is expected to be shipped in the near future, including points of origin, dates of shipments, routings, car numbers, etc. With this information it will be possible for each agency to control its own traffic and to hold up temporarily or divert specific shipments when so requested by this office.

3. Furthermore, if each governmental shipping agency and transportation group will advise this office of any conditions, or expected conditions, which may lead to traffic or terminal congestion at any port, or other important transportation centers, it will perhaps be possible to take steps necessary to clearing up or avoiding such difficulties. In the absence of such conditions or of information from this office, military or otherwise, indicating the need for some corrective. action, each agency should proceed with its transportation arrangements in the normal way.

4. This office will endeavor, through Mr. C. C. Wardlow, Chairman of the Transportation Advisory Group, who will assist me in this matter, to keep in close touch with all governmental agencies, regarding their current and prospective shipments and regarding traffic conditions at important points, so that there will be complete mutual understanding of the

problems involved, and so that the normal flow of traffic may be maintained with as little disturbance as possible.

T. H. DILLON
Colonel,
Q.M.C.